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The Clean Air Act (CAA) criminal case, United States v. San 
Diego Gas & Electric Co. (SDG&E),1 attracted national attention for 
highlighting a well-masked and disquieting fact:2  Since 1993, the 
 
1 United States v. SDG&E, No. 3:06-CR-0065 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007) (minute order 
consolidating two indictments in Criminal Case Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS and 07-CR-0484-
DMS). 
2 See, e.g., Anne Krueger, Charges Against SDG&E Rejected, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Nov. 24, 2006, at B1; Robert C. Cook, Asbestos: Appeals Court Allows New 
Criminal Trial Against San Diego Firm, Two Employees, 33 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 280 
(Mar. 23, 2009); Jocelyn Allison, US’ Asbestos Evidence Barred in San Diego Gas Case,  
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has increasingly based the 
nation’s CAA asbestos enforcement program on a test method that 
has never been promulgated into law under the Administrative 
Procedures Act and which expressly rejects key aspects of the CAA 
test method’s specific protocols for averaging asbestos content from 
representative multilayered samples.3  Described by the court as 
raising “numerous novel issues of law,”4 the three-year SDG&E case 
addressed for the first time the EPA’s credible evidence rule in a 
criminal case and whether it could fix shortcomings in agency 
rulemaking and testing methods. 
Dismissing the first indictment in 2006, the federal court in 
SDG&E concluded that basic principles of administrative law dictate 
that the EPA lacks authority to rewrite or substitute without 
rulemaking the CAA’s definitional test method for “regulated 
asbestos containing material” (RACM) as set forth by law.5  The 
government pointed unsuccessfully to the EPA’s 1997 credible 
evidence rule as authority for the proposition that “it is not limited to 
a specific test method” to prove a crime.6 
Upon reindictment in 2007, the SDG&E court then squarely 
confronted an unprecedented evidentiary question: If the government 
 
LAW360, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.law360.com/articles/120254; Robert C. Cook, 
Enforcement: Court Strikes Government’s Evidence in Asbestos Case Against San Diego 
Utility, Nat’l Env’t Daily (BNA) (Sept. 3, 2009); Anne Krueger, Judge Removes Key 
Evidence in SDG&E Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 12, 2009, at B3; Government 
Dismisses Asbestos-Contamination Claims Against SDG&E, 20 Mealey’s Litig. Rep. 
Asbestos 8 (LEXIS) (Nov. 8, 2009); Anne Krueger, Charges Against SDG&E in Asbestos 
Case Dismissed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 7, 2009, at B3. 
3 See United States v. SDG&E, No. 06-CR-0065-DMS, 2006 WL 3913457 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 21, 2006) (order granting motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the indictment 
for failure to state an offense involving jurisdictional amount of “regulated” asbestos-
containing material). 
4 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2009 WL 
4824489, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) (order denying motion of United States of 
America to admit designated evidence). 
5 SDG&E, 2006 WL 3913457, at *6–*9 (order granting motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 
3, and 5 of the indictment for failure to state an offense involving jurisdictional amount of 
“regulated” asbestos-containing material) (finding the nonpromulgated test method for 
asbestos content was nonbinding, does not replace the existing method in the regulation, 
and “may not provide the basis for the [g]overnment’s prosecution”).  “Regulated 
asbestos-containing material” must contain more than one percent asbestos as determined 
by a specified method and be in a friable state or, if not in a friable state, subject to future 
acts of disturbance that will likely make it friable.  See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2009). 
6 SDG&E, 2006 WL 3913457, at *8 (order granting motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 of the indictment for failure to state an offense involving jurisdictional amount of 
“regulated” asbestos-containing material). 
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is limited to the law’s specified test method for determining whether 
material is regulated by the CAA, does the credible evidence rule 
open the door for the government to apply nonpromulgated test 
methods in the pursuit of enforcement under the theory that virtually 
all testing, even if artificially inflated, merely “goes to [the] weight” 
of what the specified test method would have shown?7 
Since promulgation in 1997, the EPA’s credible evidence rule has 
found a narrow, niche application.  The rule has been repeatedly 
applied in citizen suits and government civil CAA enforcement cases 
where resource-intensive and sporadic compliance “reference testing” 
of plant emissions is increasingly supplemented or bypassed 
altogether by the use of publicly available and self-reported enhanced 
continuous air monitoring data from operational plants.8  Despite its 
impact on testing of emissions, the credible evidence rule has never 
been deemed to be a license to cut evidentiary corners.  As the 
SDG&E court held, the rule does not supplant the Federal Rules of 
Evidence or undercut the fundamental importance of promulgated test 
methods that define, as a threshold matter, what constitutes regulated 
material.9  Like the court in SDG&E, other courts have imposed 
common sense limits in the last several years on the extreme 
application of the credible evidence rule in enforcement actions. 
 
7 The government raised the credible evidence rule to use extensive noncompliant 
testing from twenty-seven pipe coating samples as proof of asbestos content.  See SDG&E, 
2009 WL 4824489, at *15 (order denying motion of United States of America to admit 
designated evidence). 
8 See Paul D. Hoburg, Use of Credible Evidence Rule to Prove Clean Air Act 
Violations, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 771, 785 (1998) (describing reference test 
methods as “generic multi-use test protocols that measure whether a source’s emissions 
comply with numeric standards”); see also EPA, THE USE OF INFORMATION OTHER THAN 
REFERENCE TEST RESULTS FOR DETERMINING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
(1996) (available from the ELR Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-3099) (noting that 
reference tests can cost up to $100,000 and take one week or more to complete); Credible 
Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 8314, 8315 (Feb. 24, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51, 52, 60 & 61). 
9 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 08-50072 & 08-50073, 2009 WL 689627, at *2 (9th 
Cir. Mar. 17, 2009) (agreeing with the district court); SDG&E, 2009 WL 4824489, at *15 
(order denying motion of United States of America to admit designated evidence) (finding 
the credible evidence rule has not previously been applied in a criminal case, and it cannot 
“run roughshod” over rules of evidence or rehabilitate “noncompliant samples and test 
methodologies”). 
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I 
BACKGROUND OF EPA’S CREDIBLE EVIDENCE RULE 
The credible evidence rule was born out of a combination of a 
1984 California district court decision limiting EPA enforcement 
exclusively to a specified reference test method,10 the 1990 CAA 
amendments allowing credible evidence to be used for penalty 
calculations,11 and the CAA’s section 114(a)(3) new enhanced 
monitoring program.12  For purposes of CAA civil compliance, the 
EPA specifies “not only the maximum permissible level of emissions, 
but also the performance or reference test that should be used as a 
means of sampling and analyzing air pollutants for the particular 
standard.”13  Reference test methods are the specific tests and 
protocols set forth by the regulations or permits to measure a facility’s 
air emissions compliance with numeric performance standards.14 
Citizen groups loudly complained of a growing enforcement gap 
created by the absence of admissible evidence to prove 
noncompliance.  On the one hand, citizen groups had limited access 
to admissible plant-specific reference test data.  On the other hand, 
extensive continuous emissions data (generally opacity data) were 
publicly available but off-limits for evidentiary purposes to 
demonstrate noncompliance with permit obligations.  First proposed 
by the EPA in 1993 and ultimately promulgated in 1997,15 the 
credible evidence rule was touted as the “fix” to the enforcement gap: 
 
10 United States v. Kaiser Steel Corp., No. CV 82-2623-IH, 1984 WL 186690, at *2–*3 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1984) (discussed infra at Part I.A). 
11 Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1981), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 
Stat. 2399 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
12 Id. § 7414(a)(3); see Edward B. Sears, The “Any Credible Evidence” Rule: Is EPA 
Really Holding All the Cards? 4 ENVTL. LAW. 157, 167–68 (1997) (noting that in 1996 the 
EPA decided, for various reasons, to issue the rules separately).  See generally EPA, supra 
note 8; Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314; Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Co. 
of Colo., 894 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (D. Colo. 1995) (applying concept prior to final 1997 
rule); Enhanced Monitoring Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,648, 54,676–77 (Oct. 22, 1993) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, 61 & 64) (stating that the credible evidence rule 
and enhanced monitoring rule (later restructured as the “compliance assurance 
monitoring” (CAM) rule) were originally proposed together in 1993). 
13 Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis added). 
14 Hoburg, supra note 8, at 785 (noting that in 1998, “approximately 130 reference 
methods [had] been promulgated”). 
15 Enhanced Monitoring Program, 58 Fed. Reg. at 54,659–60 (soliciting comments for 
proposed credible evidence rule and enhanced monitoring rule); Credible Evidence 
Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314. 
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For the purpose of . . . establishing whether or not a person has 
violated or is in violation of any standard in this part, nothing in this 
part shall preclude the use, including the exclusive use, of any 
credible evidence or information, relevant to whether a source 
would have been in compliance with applicable requirements if the 
appropriate performance or compliance test had been performed.16 
The EPA states that it promulgated the credible evidence rule to 
overcome and “remove[] what some have construed to be a regulatory 
bar to the admission of non-reference test data to prove a violation of 
an emission standard, no matter how credible and probative those data 
are that a violation has occurred.”17  In situations where facility 
emissions reference testing was infrequently performed, the absence 
of daily testing was construed by industry and at least one court to bar 
enforcement on each and every day lacking such testing.  To 
overcome that industry enforcement advantage, the EPA sought to 
place both sources and potential enforcers on the “same evidentiary 
footing in an enforcement action” and allow both sides to use 
nonreference data either offensively or defensively to prove or 
disprove violations.18 
In practice, the credible evidence rule’s anticipated uses by states, 
the EPA, and citizens have taken a quantum leap from the rule’s 
modest “housekeeping” beginnings, where it was portrayed as merely 
keeping the door open to enforcement on days without reference 
testing.  In SDG&E, the federal government stretched the credible 
evidence rule beyond recognition.  It argued that jurisdictional testing 
under a specified method to show whether the material was regulated 
under the CAA could be replaced or refuted under the rule with all 
sorts of dubious and inflated testing, regardless of its 
representativeness or reliability, to prove criminal violations.19  
Specifically, the EPA took the extreme position in SDG&E that where 
a particular test method is specified by law to define regulated 
material and that method weighs against any crime, as happened in 
 
16 40 C.F.R. § 61.12(e) (2009); see discussion infra Part II.B (discussing that the 
credible evidence rule was added to three CAA programs and multiple sections of the 
relevant CAA regulations). 
17 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314, 8315. 
18 Id. at 8315. 
19 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2007 WL 
4326773, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007) (order granting defendants’ motion for new trial). 
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SDG&E,20 the credible evidence rule allows the government to use 
alternate and nonpromulgated test methods that artificially inflate the 
results above regulatory limits to prosecute.  As the government 
reasoned in SDG&E, its own failure to comply with the CAA’s 
jurisdictional test method merely “go[es] to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility.”21 
To state the obvious, the EPA has no authority to enact evidentiary 
rules that overstep constitutional protections or purport to be superior 
to those of Congress or state legislatures that govern the proceedings 
of state and federal courts, such as the Federal Rules of Evidence.  As 
the Ninth Circuit concluded in the appeal of the SDG&E new trial 
ruling: 
We also reject the government’s contention that even if the samples 
were obtained in violation of the regulations, they were nonetheless 
admissible as circumstantial evidence of asbestos content under 40 
C.F.R. § 61.12(e), the “Credible Evidence Rule.”  Even if this rule 
applies to the alleged violations, it does not purport to limit the trial 
court’s discretion to exclude evidence when, as here, the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative 
value.22 
The Ninth Circuit’s rebuke of the EPA’s contention in 2009 
regarding the allegedly broad scope of the credible evidence rule 
stands in stark contrast to the EPA’s original justification for the rule 
in 1997: 
Today’s rule does not establish or alter standards with which 
sources regulated under the CAA must comply.  Rather, today’s 
rule only concerns the evidence that can be used to prove violations 
of a standard, giving full recognition to the role of reference test 
methods under the standards.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
govern the admission of evidence in all federal district court 
litigation, including CAA enforcement actions, without any 
discernible constitutional infirmity.  Similar evidentiary rules 
govern federal administrative and state environmental actions.  Our 
legal system provides that a federal or administrative law judge will 
 
20 Id. at *11 (noting that the defense presented substantial evidence calling into 
question the government’s test results at trial and which “preponderated sufficiently” 
against the verdict). 
21 See Government’s Reply Brief in Support of Proposed Sample Evidence at 13–15, 
United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
17, 2009). 
22 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 08-50072 & 08-50073, 2009 WL 689627, at *2 (9th 
Cir. Mar. 17, 2009). 
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be the ultimate, independent arbitrator of the evidence’s 
admissibility and credibility.23 
 . . . . 
Of course, in judicial enforcement proceedings, what evidence is 
credible and admissible will be determined by the court taking into 
account how the evidence was gathered and the specifics of the 
emission standard and any associated reference method.24 
In 1997, the EPA was adamant that the credible evidence rule 
simply clarifies preexisting agency powers and would change nothing 
substantively.  Specifically, the rule would (1) create no new rights 
nor powers in citizen enforcers or open the flood gates of enforcement 
for minor violations;25 (2) be limited to reference test methods only, 
which would remain the benchmark for compliance and CAA 
violations;26 and (3) not alter the stringency of emission compliance 
tests.27  At the same time, the EPA cautioned industry back in 1997 
that, in its view, Congress intended the evidentiary threshold in 
enforcement actions “to be a low one.”28 
Over time, it has become increasingly difficult for the agency to 
maintain the position that the credible evidence rule changes nothing 
when the EPA itself no longer considers mandated reference testing to 
be necessary to show CAA violations.29  While the EPA continues to 
pay lip service to the importance of reference tests for operational 
plants, it simultaneously states that these same compliance tests can 
be ignored altogether for enforcement purposes.30  The EPA reasons 
that the use of nonreference test data to prove violations and their 
duration addresses a larger public policy goal of correcting undetected 
noncompliance arising from (1) limited public access to facility 
 
23 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8317. 
24 Id. at 8322–23. 
25 See id. at 8318. 
26 See id. at 8316, 8320, 8323. 
27 See id. at 8323. 
28 See id. at 8318. 
29 See id. at 8322, 8324 (disagreeing with Senator Chafee’s and commentators’ 
argument that an initial violation must be proved with a reference test first); Brad E. 
Harker, Comment, The Incredible Effects of the EPA’s “Any Credible Evidence” Rule, 7 
DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 237, 251 (“Congress neither authorized nor imagined the 
EPA’s complete elimination of the reference test method . . . .”). 
30 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314, 8323; accord Sierra Club v. Pub. 
Serv. Co. of Colo., 894 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (D. Colo. 1995) (finding no available 
reference testing data). 
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compliance data, (2) infrequent government inspections, and (3) 
infrequent emissions compliance monitoring schedules.31 
To this day, the EPA is fond of using the metaphor that the credible 
evidence rule does nothing to change the legal speed limit, but merely 
the available tools for the enforcement police to detect whether the 
speed limit (i.e., the CAA standard of compliance) has been 
exceeded.32  Yet, the government’s application of the rule in recent 
years has been more far reaching.  As discussed herein, the credible 
evidence rule has been used in novel and multifaceted ways by the 
government to build cases of CAA violations with more lenient and 
biased test methods that have never been through rulemaking. 
A.  History of the EPA’s Credible Evidence Rule and Its “Fix” to 
the Clean Air Act Enforcement Gap 
Before the 1990 CAA amendments and the EPA’s 1997 credible 
evidence rule, air pollution standards specified not only the 
permissible levels of emissions, but also a specific reference test to 
measure objectively a source’s compliance with those limits on a 
pollutant-by-pollutant basis.33  Because the presence of a specific 
reference test in a regulation had been “read to allow only a very 
limited amount of information, i.e., data from reference test methods, 
to be used as evidence of violations[,]”34 an enforcement gap 
developed, especially with respect to facilities requiring continuous 
compliance with emissions limits.35 
According to its regulatory history, the credible evidence rule 
responded directly to the restrictive evidentiary limitations imposed 
on the EPA in 1984 following United States v. Kaiser Steel Corp.36 
Kaiser Steel involved a government civil enforcement action against 
an operational California plant for alleged violations of smoke opacity 
standards.  The EPA relied upon the broad and imprecise language of 
 
31 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314, 8315; EPA, supra note 8. 
32 See Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8326); EPA, supra note 8. 
33 See Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
34 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8317. 
35 See Andrew C. Hanson, A SIP Call for Clarity: An Analysis of the Effect of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in Sierra Club v. Tennessee Valley Authority on State 
Implementation of the Federal Credible Evidence Rule, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283, 284 
(2008). 
36 United States v. Kaiser Steel Corp., No. CV 82-2623-IH, 1984 WL 186690, at *2 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1984); accord 62 Fed. Reg. at 8320. 
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CAA section 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a),37 that dates back to the 
1970 CAA to “support its claim that it could use nonreference test 
method data in an enforcement action.”38  The Kaiser Steel court 
restricted the EPA’s ability to admit evidence of ongoing smoke 
emission opacity violations to only those days during which the 
promulgated visual observation reference method (known as Method 
9) was actually performed.39  Stated differently, those days upon 
which the Method 9 visual observation reference method was not 
performed at the plant were, by definition, off-limits for enforcement 
purposes under the rationale of Kaiser Steel.40 
The EPA complained bitterly that thousands of irrefutable and 
scientifically documented plant violations would go unpunished.41  
Complicating matters further was the fact that the facility in Kaiser 
Steel had no obligation to perform the reference test on a continuous 
basis.  The EPA noted a serious enforcement dilemma—mandated 
compliance testing is “sporadic” and often done only once per year, or 
perhaps once every five years.42  Accordingly, taking Kaiser Steel to 
its logical conclusion, the EPA, states, and citizens were foreclosed 
from enforcing opacity violations on potentially hundreds of days per 
year during which visual compliance testing was not required. 
Despite arguments from the EPA and commentators that the 
legislative history of the CAA’s 1990 amendments plainly cast Kaiser 
Steel aside,43 and that Congress fixed the enforcement gap for citizens 
and the federal and state governments, the actual statutory response 
from Congress in 1990 was far more conservative.  The only part of 
 
37 42 U.S.C § 7413(a) (1981), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2672 (Nov. 
15, 1990), invalidated by Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1238 (11th Cir. 
2003) (“Whenever, on the basis of any information available to the Administrator, the 
Administrator finds that any person has violated or is in violation of any requirement or 
prohibition of an applicable implementation plan or permit, the Administrator . . . . may     
. . . bring a civil action [to enforce the CAA].”) (emphasis added). 
38 See Sears, supra note 12, at 164–65. 
39 Method 9 is the genesis of Revised Method 9 discussed at length in Donner Hanna 
Coke Corp. v. Costle, 464 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), which was again modified by 
the EPA outside the rulemaking process to test, under threat of criminal prosecution, 
Donner Hanna’s noncontinuous coke oven emissions. 
40 See Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8320. 
41 EPA, supra note 8, at 2. 
42 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8315; see also S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 
358 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3741; Hanson, supra note 35, at 284. 
43 See generally Hanson, supra note 35, at 292–302 (citing Credible Evidence 
Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8315). 
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the CAA after the 1990 amendments that explicitly references 
“credible evidence” is section 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1), 
where it is merely designated as one of several “penalty assessment 
criteria” that has nothing to do with whether a violation has occurred 
in the first instance.44  The amended 1990 CAA statute provides that 
“[i]n determining the amount of any penalty to be assessed under this 
section or section 7604(a) of this title, the Administrator or the court, 
as appropriate, shall take into consideration . . . the duration of the 
violation as established by any credible evidence (including evidence 
other than the applicable test method) . . . .”45  There is no explicit 
reference to Kaiser Steel in the statute or the evidentiary challenges 
that the 1984 California case created for the EPA. 
Incoherently, the EPA argues to this day that the post–1990 fix for 
the enforcement gap through credible evidence rule rulemaking was 
unnecessary because the agency always enjoyed “long-standing 
authority,” even before the 1990 CAA amendments, to resort to all 
available evidence in enforcement actions.46  The EPA’s actions speak 
otherwise.  The EPA evidently felt compelled to promulgate a new 
evidentiary rule between 1993 and 1997 and demand that states revise 
their own rules to follow it.47  Several courts have found the EPA’s 
 
44 Harker, supra note 29, at 250.  The EPA also regularly points to CAA section 113(a) 
and its nonspecific language, “[w]henever, on the basis of any information available to the 
Administrator,” as inherent authority for the credible evidence rule even prior to the 1990 
CAA amendments.  See Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314 (emphasis 
added). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
46 According to the EPA, four years of rulemaking did nothing more than “clarify” 
existing authority that “data from reference test methods are not the exclusive means of 
establishing noncompliance or compliance in enforcement actions.”  Credible Evidence 
Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8322.  But, in adopting the credible evidence rule, the EPA 
cited to the 1990 CAA amendments.  Id. at 8321–22.  Specifically, the EPA relied on CAA 
section 113(e), which provides the following: “In determining the amount of any penalty 
to be assessed under this section . . . the court, as appropriate, shall take into consideration 
. . . the duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence (including 
evidence other than the applicable test method). . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (emphasis 
added). 
47 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314 (“[C]redible evidence revisions 
are based on EPA’s long-standing authority under the [Clean Air] Act, and on amplified 
authority provided by the 1990 CAA Amendments.”); Hanson, supra note 35, at 301 
(citing Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8315). 
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inconsistency and equivocation on its own authority with or without 
the credible evidence rule to be noteworthy.48 
B.  The Federal Credible Evidence Rule Is Incorporated into Three 
Clean Air Act Programs 
The EPA credible evidence rule expressly applies to three major 
CAA programs set forth in 40 C.F.R. Parts 51, 52, 60, and 61, where 
self-reporting is crucial.49  The programs include the following: 
1. CAA section 110:50  Attainment of National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants, such as 
ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter, implemented 
through federally approved State Implementation Plans (SIP) 
found in 40 C.F.R. Parts 51 and 5251 
2. CAA section 111:52  Permitting of newly constructed or 
modified major stationary sources (e.g., power plants) that fall 
within the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 
program found in 40 C.F.R. Part 60 
3. CAA section 112:53  National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) found in 40 C.F.R. Part 
6154 
The EPA added nearly identical language in 1997 to the regulations 
implementing these three separate CAA programs, which are 
individually and collectively referred to as the credible evidence rule, 
 
48 See Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating 
that if the federal credible evidence rule changes nothing, there would have been “no point 
in EPA’s insisting that each state adopt [the evidentiary] rule”). 
49 EPA, supra note 8, at 4–6. 
50 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). 
51 The architecture of the CAA is built upon the basic federalist principle that the EPA 
is tasked with developing National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six 
criteria pollutants, and the individual fifty states are tasked with developing SIPs at the 
local level to achieve those NAAQS. Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 
1297, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 443 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“Each state’s SIP must be approved by the [EPA] and, once approved, [becomes] 
enforceable in the [federal] courts by an action filed by either the State, the [federal 
government], or by citizens.”). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). 
53 Id. § 7412. 
54 The credible evidence rule was added to five sections of CAA regulations.  See, e.g., 
40 C.F.R. §§ 51.212(c) (2009) (SIP “source surveillance” test methods), 52.12(c) 
(approval of SIP compliance programs), 52.33(a) (SIP compliance certifications), 60.11(g) 
(NSPS compliance standards), 61.12(e) (hazardous air pollutant NESHAP compliance 
program). 
 2010] Test Methods Matter 49 
or occasionally the “all credible evidence rule.”55  In order to ensure 
the “evidentiary rules for CAA violations are consistent in all fifty 
states,” the EPA concurrently initiated in 1997 a “SIP call” to all 
states calling upon each to modify its SIP to adopt the credible 
evidence rule.56 
After promulgation, the credible evidence rule was initially touted 
as a government and citizen enforcement tool to prevent 
circumvention or concealment57 of continuous emissions limits under 
the three CAA programs, each of which is built upon self-reporting of 
emissions within the exclusive control of the regulated facility.  The 
EPA justified the rule’s promulgation on the grounds that “infrequent 
on-site inspections and even more infrequent reference tests . . . to 
check compliance with emission limits at major stationary sources” 
were “inadequate to ensure that sources continuously stay within their 
emission limits.”58  The EPA explained that reference test data could 
be manipulated in such a way that it was not representative of actual 
operating conditions, and that such tests were also expensive and 
burdensome to perform.59 
The credible evidence rule was designed originally to address an 
evidentiary imbalance that largely disfavored the government, but that 
goal has been lost through “after the fact revisionism” in the 
aggressive pursuit of case-specific enforcement to cure government 
 
55 The pertinent language of the credible evidence rule from each of the programs states 
that, for purposes of compliance evaluations, nothing shall “preclude the use, including the 
exclusive use, of any credible evidence or information, relevant to whether a source would 
have been in compliance with applicable requirements if the appropriate performance or 
compliance test or procedure had been performed.”  40 C.F.R. § 51.212(c); see also id. §§ 
52.12(c), 52.33(a), 60.11(g), 61.12(e). 
56 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 8314, 8327 (Feb. 24, 1997) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60 & 61) (as of 1996, fifteen states and Puerto Rico 
responded to the “SIP call” and submitted credible evidence rule amendments to their SIPs 
for EPA approval); accord Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F. 3d 1337, 1342–43, 
1351–52 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing how the EPA mandates that each state adopt its own 
credible evidence rule as part of enforceable test methods). 
57 See 40 C.F.R. § 61.19 (defining concealment as activities that take various forms, 
such as the use of control equipment, gaseous dilution, or modifications designed to mask 
a violation.). 
58 62 Fed. Reg. at 8315. 
59 See 62 Fed. Reg. at 8315 (“Reference tests may not yield a representative emissions 
picture because the sources typically schedule, set up and run the tests themselves.  This 
allows sources to ‘fine tune’ their operations and emissions control processes prior to the 
tests, and generate results that may not be typical of day-to-day source operations.  
Reference tests can also be expensive and burdensome:  They can cost up to $100,000, and 
take a week or more to complete.”) (citations omitted). 
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missteps.60  The SDG&E case (discussed infra in Part III.A.) is a 
prime example of this. 
C.  Courts Recognize but Limit the Reach of the Credible Evidence 
Rule 
1.  Credible Evidence Rule Cases That Predate Its 1997 
Promulgation 
Two federal cases followed the 1993 proposed rule but predate its 
1997 promulgation.  Both cited the then-proposed rule’s basic 
objectives in allowing citizen enforcement groups to use nonreference 
data to prove CAA civil violations.  The pivotal issue in both citizen 
suits was the evidentiary value, if any, of publicly available and self-
reported plant data that did not conform to infrequently performed 
reference testing. 
Sierra Club v. Public Service Co. of Colorado61 involved an 
environmental group’s use of a Colorado coal power plant’s 
continuous opacity monitoring data in lieu of the infrequently 
performed Method 9 opacity reference testing as proof of over 19,000 
violations during five years of the twenty percent opacity (particulate 
matter) standard under Colorado’s SIP.62  Method 9 compliance 
testing by a state-certified observer was necessary at the Colorado 
power plant every six months, but the facility was also obligated to 
use continuous monitoring under its permit.63  No Method 9 
compliance testing showing noncompliance was available to the 
citizen groups because of plant access limitations.64 
In allowing the use of nonreference test data to prove opacity 
violations, not just the duration of violations after the reference test 
showed a CAA violation, the district court concluded that the purpose 
of citizen suits would be frustrated if enforcement suits were limited 
exclusively to Method 9 data because citizen groups do not have the 
necessary plant access rights to perform such on-site testing.65  Even 
the plant owner agreed, according to the court, that the twenty percent 
 
60 See Harker, supra note 29, at 252; see also discussion of credible evidence rule case 
law infra Part I.C. 
61 Sierra Club v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 894 F. Supp. 1455, 1459 (D. Colo. 1995). 
62 Id. at 1456. 
63 Id. at 1456, 1460. 
64 Id. at 1457. 
65 Id. at 1460. 
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continuous opacity monitoring data had a high indicia of reliability.66  
The Colorado court cited for support the 1990 amended “credible 
evidence” statutory language of CAA section 113(e)(1) and the 
legislative history addressing Congressional objections to the 1984 
Kaiser Steel decision.67 
In Unitek Environmental Services, Inc. v. Hawaiian Cement,68 the 
court similarly allowed a combination of nonreference testing 
evidence in a citizen suit against a cement manufacturing plant to 
prove particulate matter dust emission violations under Hawaii’s SIP 
for five years.  The citizen enforcer was a downwind corporation 
adversely impacted by the cement dust.  The downwind neighbor 
sought to rely on a variety of evidentiary sources to prove violations, 
including the issuance of past notices of violation at the plant, the 
plant’s own negotiated site-specific monitoring plan, internal plant 
memoranda, and even hypothetical computerized modeling of 
emissions in support of a permit.69  Like the court in Public Service 
Co. of Colorado, the Hawaiian Cement court pointed to CAA section 
113(e) and its legislative history to conclude that the credible 
evidence standard is “lenient,”70 and the combination of nonreference 
evidence as a whole “is credible.”71 
In later cases, the EPA and citizen groups regularly pointed to 
these early decisions to argue, with mixed results, that the credible 
evidence rule did not actually create new rights, but merely clarified 
powers that the government and citizens always had.72  The rationale 
of Hawaiian Cement and Public Service Co. of Colorado, however, 
has not been uniformly followed by other courts.73 
 
66 Id. at 1459–60. 
67 Id. at 1461. 
68 Unitek Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Hawaiian Cement, No. CV 95-00723, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19261 (D. Haw. Aug. 7, 1997) (order granting plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 
judgment and denying defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment). 
69 Id. at *7–*12. 
70 Id. at *11–*12. 
71 Id. 
72 EPA, supra note 8, at 8; Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 8314, 8318–19 
(Feb. 24, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60 & 61); accord Hanson, supra 
note 35, at 308. 
73 See infra Part I.C.3. 
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2.  Industries Challenge the Promulgated Credible Evidence Rule in 
1998–99 as Introducing Uncertainty in Enforcement and 
Changing Applicable Emissions Limits Without Rulemaking 
The credible evidence rule has generated widespread industry 
objections from the outset,74 and it was vigorously challenged twice 
following its 1997 promulgation.75  The rule has been described as the 
“most significant and controversial piece of legislation to come out of 
the CAA.”76 
In the consolidated case of Clean Air Implementation Project v. 
EPA,77 industry groups challenged the EPA on the grounds that the 
new evidentiary rule fundamentally altered the means of determining 
CAA compliance and thus is tantamount to changing the standard of 
testing (e.g., reference tests) and the standard of compliance specified 
in the regulation itself.78  Industry groups also contended that the rule 
converted “periodic” compliance standards into more rigorous 
“continuous” ones.79  The rule, industry protested, would also 
discourage self-audits.80  The EPA again dismissed the objections on 
the grounds that the rule changes nothing in terms of substantive 
emission standards;81 it merely allows “alternate methods [to] yield 
 
74 See Sears, supra note 12, at 161–62, 174–84. 
75 Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8317, 8318 (stating that the EPA 
acknowledges that “[s]ome industry representatives have expressed concern that the use of 
credible evidence in compliance determinations will reveal multiple minor violations for 
which EPA, the states or citizens will bring lawsuits”).  The EPA’s comment about 
industry concern may have been a gross understatement, as the EPA received more than 
800 comments about the proposed one-page rule, mainly from industry.  Additionally, 
ninety-six petitions for review were filed after promulgation and consolidated under lead 
case Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  See 
Hoburg, supra note 8, at 772. 
76 Harker, supra note 29, at 262. 
77 Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1203. 
78 Id.; EPA, supra note 8, at 2 (“Some regulated sources have argued that allowing the 
use of credible evidence to determine whether or not a source is in compliance with an 
emissions standard increases the stringency of the standard; others have argued that states, 
EPA and citizens will use credible evidence to bring enforcement actions for minor 
violations.”). 
79 Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1203–04. 
80 Harker, supra note 29, at 260–62. 
81 EPA, supra note 8, at 2 (“By clearly providing that reference test methods are not 
exclusive methods, EPA does not intend to alter the underlying standards.”). 
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data bearing on what the results of a reference test would have 
been.”82 
The D.C. Circuit in Clean Air Implementation Project concluded 
that industry’s challenges were not then ripe, and the wide array of 
hypothetical industry fears raised “too many imponderables.”83  The 
court stated that industry groups upset by the potential application of 
the rule would have to await an actual enforcement action to test its 
limits: “An enforcement action brought on the basis of credible 
evidence would, we believe, provide the factual development 
necessary to determine whether the new rule has affected whatever 
existing standard is involved.”84  One year later, the D.C. Circuit 
again tossed aside as unripe a similar challenge of the credible 
evidence rule by industry groups that intervened in a case challenging 
the enhanced monitoring rule—a rule that in 1993 originated 
concurrently with, and helped give rise to, the credible evidence 
rule.85 
3.  Post–1997 Credible Evidence Rule Case Law Is Mixed for 
Industry and Enforcement 
Since the D.C. Circuit twice passed on the chance to evaluate the 
legality of the credible evidence rule in 1998 and 1999, fewer than ten 
ripe cases have squarely addressed the rule, its scope, and its 
limitations.  The majority of credible evidence rule cases are citizen 
suits that address the rule in the context of a plant’s permitting or 
compliance with opacity standards.  Only two cases arise in the 
context of criminal enforcement, where the government attempted in 
both to apply the credible evidence rule to asbestos removal projects 
having nothing to do with an operational plant or continuous 
emissions.  In its first criminal case test run, the rule fell short of the 
government’s evidentiary objectives.  The credible evidence rule did 
not absolve the government’s missteps and enable it to disregard basic 
elements of proof, such as representative sampling or mandated 
definitional testing, to determine whether the material was federally 
regulated and thus subject to asbestos NESHAP work practices.86 
 
82 Clean Air Implementation Project, 150 F.3d at 1205. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 194 F.3d 130, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
86 See United States v. SDG&E, No. 06-CR-0065-DMS, 2006 WL 3913457, at *8 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 21, 2006) (order granting motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the  
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Sierra Club v. Tennessee Valley Authority87 exemplifies the 
prototypical civil or citizen enforcement case where the credible 
evidence rule has been tested since 1997.  Tennessee Valley Authority 
involved self-reported continuous monitoring data for smoke opacity 
generated in response to the plant’s permit obligations.88  Large 
utilities are required, in response to the 1990 CAA amendments, to 
install enhanced continuous opacity monitoring systems (COMS) or 
continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) on their smoke 
stacks.89 
The environmental groups in Tennessee Valley Authority had no 
available reference test (i.e., Method 9 opacity) data and attempted to 
use the Alabama plant’s own self-reported and publicly available 
COMS data to demonstrate that the Alabama coal-fired electric power 
plant regularly violated the applicable twenty percent opacity 
limitation to control particulate matter emissions.90  The plant owner 
performed its mandated Method 9 test “only periodically,” typically 
one to fifteen days per year to perform a single reference test, and 
only during daylight hours.91  The Method 9 reference method for 
opacity therefore measured plant compliance, at most, for only 0.5% 
of the plant’s operational time each year.92 
Without Method 9 test data in hand, the environmental groups 
relied instead upon continuous opacity monitoring data produced both 
before and after Alabama’s version of the credible evidence rule was 
adopted through state rulemaking in 1999.93  In a striking blow to the 
EPA’s official position that the credible evidence rule is simply 
“housekeeping” that changes nothing substantively,94 the Eleventh 
Circuit rejected the retroactive application of the state’s credible 
 
indictment for failure to state an offense involving jurisdictional amount of “regulated” 
asbestos-containing material). 
87 Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). 
88 See id. at 1339. 
89 See, e.g., id. at 1340–41. 
90 Id. at 1343. 
91 Id. at 1341–42, 1347. 
92 Id. at 1347. 
93 See id. at 1349–50; Ala. Admin. Code r. 335-3-1.13(2) (2008) (effective May 20, 
1999).  Alabama’s credible evidence rule states, “any credible evidence or information 
relevant to whether a source would have been in compliance with applicable requirements 
if the appropriate performance or compliance test had been performed, can be used to 
establish whether or [] not an owner or operator has violated or is in violation of any rule 
or standard in this Division.”  Id. 
94 See Sears, supra note 12, at 161. 
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evidence rule and the use of any non–Method 9 data to prove 
violations prior to local adoption in 1999.95  However, instead of 
bringing Kaiser Steel back to life, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that 
alternative types of opacity testing could be considered prospectively 
after the State’s 1999 adoption of the federal credible evidence rule.96  
But the evidentiary availability of post–1999 nonreference data 
ultimately failed to support CAA violations under the facts of 
Tennessee Valley Authority for sovereign immunity reasons.97 
Although the Eleventh Circuit imposed boundaries on the potential 
application of the credible evidence rule that displeased the EPA and 
environmental groups, it rejected the Kaiser Steel rationale long 
embraced by industry, i.e., that CAA violations are limited 
exclusively to only those days of the year upon which reference test 
results document noncompliance.  The Eleventh Circuit embraced the 
EPA analogy that the credible evidence rule is comparable to the use 
of radar guns and increased police checks to ensure compliance, not a 
substantive change in the speed limit itself.98  Nonetheless, the 
Eleventh Circuit imposed real limits on any retroactive application of 
“increased police checks” under the credible evidence rule.  
Specifically, the rule must first be promulgated by the states to be 
enforceable as part of the federally enforceable SIP.  If the Eleventh 
Circuit holding were applied nationally, the early citizen suit 
successes in Hawaiian Cement (1997) and Public Service Co. of 
Colorado (1995), which predate the rule’s promulgation, might not 
have been possible because those states had not then adopted the 
pending federal rule. 
The remaining civil cases follow the same basic template of 
Hawaiian Cement and Public Service Co. of Colorado.  In Sierra 
Club v. Georgia Power Co.,99 Georgia Power was sued by 
environmental groups under the state’s SIP because of opacity and 
hazardous air pollutant violations.100  The plant was required by its 
 
95 Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d at 1342–43.  The court found that data that did not 
comply with opacity reference test Method 9 “cannot be used to determine whether pre-
May 20, 1999 emissions violated the opacity limitation.” Id. at 1351. 
96 Id. at 1343. 
97 Id. at 1356–57. 
98 Id. at 1348 (citing Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 8314, 8326 (Feb. 24, 
1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60 & 61)). 
99 Sierra Club v. Ga. Power Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2004), rev’d on other 
grounds, 443 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2006). 
100 Id. at 1300–02. 
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operational Title V permit to report continuous opacity monitoring 
data quarterly, which evidently showed thousands of exceedances of 
the opacity standard.101  Georgia Power claimed, without success, that 
only Method 9 testing could prove opacity violations.102  At the same 
time, the plant offered no Method 9 data to refute the violations 
shown by the nonreference continuous monitoring data.103 
The Georgia Power court pointed to the credible evidence rule and 
the four prior federal cases that allowed into evidence continuous 
nonreference data.  The court concluded that Georgia Power’s 
continuous monitoring data was sufficiently credible prima facie 
evidence of violations to be comparable to Method 9 reference test 
data.104  A distinguishing fact makes the Georgia Power case unique: 
instead of offering exculpatory Method 9 data, Georgia Power 
attacked its own continuous monitoring systems as unreliable, which 
the court found unpersuasive and insufficient to avoid civil liability.105 
In Grand Canyon Trust v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico,106 an 
environmental group overreached in its intended application of the 
credible evidence rule by arguing that all Method 9 reference test data 
should be excluded from evidence.  The citizen suit against a New 
Mexico public utility focused on whether a preconstruction CAA 
permit was required.  The novel pretrial evidentiary issue before the 
court was whether continuous monitoring data offered by the 
environmental group was irrefutable evidence of violations equivalent 
to, or even superior than, Method 9 results.107  The environmental 
group sought to exclude all Method 9 data on the grounds that 
continuous monitoring data offered irrefutable evidence of violations.  
The court disagreed, holding that continuous monitoring data may be 
relevant and admissible, but it certainly can be attacked by the utility 
as inaccurate or even contradicted by Method 9 evidence.108 
Two cases decided soon after the adoption of the credible evidence 
rule found no problem whatsoever with the rule.  In L.E.A.D. (Local 
 
101 Id. at 1301. 
102 Id. at 1306. 
103 Id. at 1308. 
104 Id. at 1306–08. 
105 Id. at 1300–01. 
106 Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1247 
(D.N.M. 2003). 
107 Id. at 1247–48. 
108 Id. at 1248–49. 
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Environmental Awareness Development) Group of Burks v. Exide 
Corp., a coalition of environmental groups and neighbors litigated a 
multifaceted water and air citizen suit against the owner of a lead 
recycling and smelting facility under the Pennsylvania SIP.109  The 
case focused on sulfur dioxide NAAQS emission exceedances.  
Without extensive discussion, the court held that under the recently 
promulgated credible evidence rule, the plaintiffs’ use of continuous 
emissions monitoring data reported by the facility “is entirely 
appropriate evidence of Defendants multiple violations of the sulfur 
dioxide emission limitations in their state permits.”110 
In another Pennsylvania case, the federal government sued the 
owner of Pittsburgh Coke Works for coke emission violations under 
Pennsylvania’s SIP.111  The plant operator invoked the Kaiser Steel 
defense and argued that the federal government could not base civil 
violations upon the plant’s continuous emissions monitoring data 
because such testing was not the approved method of determining 
compliance under the state’s SIP.112  The court disagreed, citing the 
1999 L.E.A.D. Pennsylvania case and holding that, in general, a 
plant’s continuous emissions monitoring was “credible evidence” 
under CAA section 113(e)(1).113 
In SDG&E, the first criminal case to address the credible evidence 
rule, the Ninth Circuit imposed additional common sense limits in 
2009.  The government took an extreme, anything goes evidentiary 
position that in proving a CAA crime, the credible evidence rule 
allows the government to rely exclusively on nonrepresentative 
sampling and even improperly conducted test results to prove 
criminal violations.114  Stated differently, if the required one percent 
asbestos NESHAP definitional test shows no CAA jurisdiction, as 
was the case in SDG&E, the government should be able to invoke the 
credible evidence rule to offer a jury any amount of inflated results 
 
109 L.E.A.D (Local Envtl. Awareness Dev.) Group of Burks v. Exide Corp., No. CV 96-
3030, 1999 WL 124473, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999). 
110 Id. at *28. 
111 United States v. LTV Steel Co., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 624, 626 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
112 Id. at 633. 
113 L.E.A.D, 1999 WL 124473, at *27. 
114 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2007 WL 
4326773, at *2, *10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007) (order granting defendants’ motion for a new 
trial).  In the first trial, the government presented eighteen samples; all but five were 
destroyed after testing.  Id.  Of those eighteen, twelve were nonrepresentative debris, two 
were incomplete, and four were tested by nonconforming methods.  Id. 
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performed on nonrepresentative debris or produced by dubious 
protocols to mask the correct results.115 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the credible evidence rule, if 
applicable to criminal cases at all, goes no further than what is 
allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, as determined by the trial 
judge.116  If government evidence is deemed misleading and unfairly 
prejudicial, the credible evidence rule does not make it otherwise.  
The SDG&E court thus vindicated the basic scientific principles of 
representative sampling, the overarching importance of data produced 
by the specified NESHAP test method that defines whether the 
material is regulated under the CAA, and even the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, all of which remain unchanged by the credible evidence 
rule. 
4.  The Credible Evidence Rule Is Not Applicable to Prove Clean Air 
Act Violations Relevant to Private Contract Disputes 
Over a decade after adoption of the credible evidence rule by the 
EPA and various states, the credible evidence rule is being offered for 
new and once-unanticipated uses, even outside CAA enforcement.  In 
2009, the credible evidence rule was held to be completely 
unavailable to private litigants in a contract dispute involving a 
plant’s emissions.117  In BP Amoco, the plant buyer sought to use 
evidence other than the testing method specified in the Illinois plant’s 
operational permit to show presale noncompliance with the plant’s 
Title V permit; such noncompliance would then trigger the contract’s 
indemnity provisions in favor of the buyer.118  The court rejected the 
use of evidence outside the specific testing authorized by the plant 
permit, reasoning that the EPA credible evidence rule is limited to 
“federal enforcement actions,” and even suggested that the credible 
evidence rule is misplaced in citizen suits.119  It held that the buyer’s 
 
115 Id. at *11 (finding defense testing preponderated sufficiently against verdicts). 
116 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 08-50072, 08-50073, 2009 WL 689627, at *2 (9th 
Cir. Mar. 17, 2009). 
117 BP Amoco Chem. Co. v. Flint Hills Res., 615 F. Supp. 2d 765, 773–75 (N.D. Ill. 
2009). 
118 Id. at 773. 
119 Id. at 773–75.  There is disagreement about whether the credible evidence rule is 
available in citizen enforcement suits.  The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the “plain 
language” of the credible evidence rule is “for purposes of Federal enforcement,” and 
citizen suits are not federal enforcement.  Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d at 
1352–53 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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“proof of noncompliance is limited to the means and methods 
specified in the Title V Permit.”120 
Six federal cases, including the two appellate rulings from the 
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, have squarely addressed the credible 
evidence rule since the two unripe D.C. Circuit industry challenges.  
These cases have helped to shape a niche application over the last 
decade: the rule allows the use of continuous monitoring data in 
substitution of infrequent reference testing to prove CAA violations.  
The scope of the credible evidence rule today is certainly broader than 
what industry believes is appropriate given the purpose of reference 
tests under the CAA, but the scope is also much narrower than the 
anything goes evidentiary position favored by the government and 
citizen plaintiffs.  Some of the limits imposed thus far on the credible 
evidence rule relate to the exclusion of misleading data under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence; testing relevant to private contracts; 
representative sampling; and even specified CAA definitional test 
methods that frame, for example, what constitutes “regulated 
asbestos-containing material”—the core issue in the SDG&E criminal 
case. 
II 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT ASBESTOS NESHAP TEST METHODS ARE 
NOT SUPPLANTED BY THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE RULE 
In the SDG&E case, the government purported to apply the 
credible evidence rule for the first time to jurisdictional CAA 
definitions for asbestos-containing materials that technically have 
nothing to do with plant emissions standards or reference tests.121  To 
be clear, asbestos is one of the 189 “hazardous air pollutants” listed 
under CAA section 112(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1), with a 
corresponding EPA-promulgated national emission standard (asbestos 
NESHAP), located at 40 C.F.R. part 61, subpart M.  However, 
asbestos lacks any emissions-related reference method.122  As 
discussed below, the reason is purely practical. 
 
120 BP Amoco, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 775. 
121 SDG&E, 2009 WL 689627, at *2. 
122 The hazardous air pollutant or NESHAP program’s credible evidence rule is located 
within its general provisions. 40 C.F.R. § 61.12(e) (2009).  The general provisions also 
define various “reference methods” by which to measure continuous air emissions of 
specific hazardous air pollutants, none of which includes asbestos.  See id. § 61.02.  The 
regulations enumerate sixteen NESHAP air emission reference test methods to monitor 
emissions for the following seven hazardous air pollutants: mercury, beryllium, vinyl  
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EPA explained that the asbestos NESHAP does not mandate any 
air emissions reference testing or air monitoring whatsoever to prove 
CAA compliance because it is difficult and costly to monitor total 
asbestos emissions in typically geographically diffuse, urban 
demolition or renovation projects.123  Rather, the asbestos NESHAP is 
built upon an array of approximately one dozen indirect, field-level 
“work practices” (e.g., preremoval watering) designed to minimize 
the release of asbestos fibers.124  As discussed herein, the government 
tried to look beyond emissions-related reference testing that once 
justified EPA’s credible evidence rule to completely unrelated 
definitional and jurisdictional CAA test methods and the key 
definitions for regulated asbestos-containing material.  The original 
nexus between emissions testing and the credible evidence rule was at 
risk of fading in importance. 
To appreciate how it is possible for EPA national enforcement 
policy to become so dramatically unhinged from long-standing 
regulatory law, one must look at the NESHAP’s evolution and 
history.125  The credible evidence rule could not years later serve to 
bridge the divide and mitigate the adverse consequences of the 
government’s choice in favor of agency policy over the law. 
A.  Asbestos NESHAP Test Method 
For the first seventeen years of the asbestos NESHAP’s existence, 
1973 to 1990, the asbestos content of material was measured on the 
basis of percentage weight, and no particular test method was 
enumerated by the regulation to determine asbestos content.  By 1990, 
the EPA had decided it was “long overdue” to adopt a specific test 
method to determine asbestos content to “reduce confusion over what 
activities are subject to the regulation.”126  The EPA then initiated 
 
chloride, arsenic, polonium, radionuclides, and radon.  See id. § 61.02 (definition of 
NESHAP’s “reference method”); 40 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. E (2009) (containing a total of 
sixteen test methods for seven hazardous air pollutants). 
123 See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. pt. 21 
(2009); Amendments to Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 48,296 
(Oct. 14, 1975) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). 
124 See Robert M. Howard, Patricia Guerrero, David B. McGrath & Drew R. Van 
Orden, The EPA’s Prosecution of Clean Air Act Asbestos NESHAP Cases Based Upon 
Nonbinding Bulk Material Test Methods, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 173, 198–200 (2007). 
125 For a more complete summary of the legislative history of the NESHAP, see id. 
126 See OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, U.S. EPA, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS 
FOR ASBESTOS—BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROMULGATED ASBESTOS NESHAP 
REVISIONS, EPA 450/3-90-017, 4-12 (1990). 
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rulemaking to, among other things, substitute the regulation’s weight-
based standard (with no specific test method) because it had 
concluded that a one percent dry weight standard tended to 
underestimate asbestos quantity in denser materials.127 
Instead of developing an entirely new CAA test method to quantify 
asbestos for NESHAP purposes alone, the EPA elected instead to 
incorporate the previously promulgated asbestos test method, which 
had twice been through EPA rulemaking in 1982 and 1987, under a 
non-CAA statute.128  That test method was incorporated into the very 
definition of “asbestos-containing material” and “regulated asbestos-
containing material” (RACM) under the NESHAP, and therefore now 
defines the universe of regulated materials (the “1990 test method” or 
“NESHAP test method”).129  As discussed herein, changing the test 
method literally changes key definitions in the asbestos NESHAP 
regulations and the universe of regulated materials.130 
At its basic foundation, the NESHAP test method mandates a 
multistep analysis of all layers of a material to generate a composite 
or “average” asbestos percentage result for the material as a whole: 
Bulk samples of building materials taken for the identification and 
quantitation of asbestos are first examined for homogeneity . . . . 
When discrete strata are identified, each is treated as a separate 
material so that fibers are first identified and quantified in that 
layer only, and then the results for each layer are combined to yield 
an estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample.131 
The SDG&E court concluded that section 1.7.2.1 of the NESHAP test 
method required volumetric averaging of all layers as they existed 
prior to removal.132  By contrast, the government’s criminal case was 
 
127 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP 
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,410 (Nov. 20, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) 
(noting that cement-based fireproofing material containing an unregulated amount of less 
than one percent asbestos by weight actually contains thirty percent asbestos by area). 
128 See Interim Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples, 
40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E (2009) (TSCA regulation). 
129 EPA, TEST METHOD: INTERIM METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF ASBESTOS IN 
BULK INSULATION SAMPLES, EPA 600/M4-82-020 (1982), cited in 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, 
subpt. E, app. E [hereinafter 1990 TEST METHOD]. 
130 See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (incorporating by reference the 1990 test method into the 
definition of asbestos-containing material and RACM). 
131 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E, § 1.7.2.1 (emphasis added). 
132 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2009 WL 
4824489, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) (order denying motion of United States of  
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built on the theory that if any single layer of a nonrepresentative 
sample contained more than one percent asbestos, the entire 
multilayered system was federally regulated under the asbestos 
NESHAP.133  The credible evidence rule could not bridge the divide 
between what the law mandated and the government’s theory of 
prosecution. 
B.  The Nonbinding EPA 1993 Test Method 
A few years after the 1990 promulgation of the first and only 
asbestos NESHAP test method, the EPA concluded that averaging 
under the proper application of this method excluded certain 
multilayered materials from the definition of RACM.  In 1993, the 
EPA therefore concluded that a new asbestos test method was 
desirable.134 
It is clear from both the content of the 1993 test method and the 
EPA’s own admissions that rulemaking was required to make the test 
method binding.  But no such rulemaking occurred.  The 1993 test 
method promised “significant revisions” to the 1990 NESHAP test 
method and “new procedures.”135  Included among the significant 
revisions was an emphatic rejection of the multilayered averaging of 
asbestos content mandated by the NESHAP test method.136 
By the EPA’s own admission, the much improved 1993 test 
method substantially expanded the universe of regulated material to 
include material not otherwise above the one percent threshold under 
the NESHAP test method: 
Because the [NESHAP test method] allowed the result to be 
reported as one number, multi-layered samples which may contain 
asbestos in a single layer may have been reported by laboratories as 
nonasbestos-containing.  The improved method directs laboratories 
to analyze and report a result for individual layers . . . . [A] multi-
layered sample which previously was determined to be nonasbestos-
 
America to admit designated evidence) (citing Order, Case No. 07-CR-0484-DMS (Apr. 
12, 2007)). 
133 Government’s Bill of Particulars at 9, United States v. SDG&E, Case No. 06-CR-
0065-DMS (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2006) (“If any of the layers, standing alone, meets the 
definition of regulated asbestos containing material (i.e., over [one percent] asbestos and 
friable), then the entire material is deemed to be regulated asbestos containing material, 
and the NESHAP work practice standards are applicable to the project.”). 
134 See EPA, METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF ASBESTOS IN BULK BUILDING 
MATERIALS, EPA 600/R-93/116 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 TEST METHOD]. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 6–7. 
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containing may now have layers which will be classified as 
asbestos-containing based on the presence of asbestos in greater 
than [one]percent.137 
In the absence of any federal rulemaking since 1990 to modify the 
NESHAP test method and its jurisdictional significance, at least ten 
states have expressly adopted the 1993 test method into their 
respective state asbestos regulations.138  In 2002, for example, Texas 
enacted rules to disallow averaging under the NESHAP test method 
for multilayered materials.139  In 2006, New Jersey adopted the 1993 
test method in place of the NESHAP test method in emergency 
rulemaking because, to the dismay of state regulators, New Jersey 
contractors were relying upon the literal language of the NESHAP 
test method to exclude material as nonregulated.140 
Of note, some states authorized the use of both the 1990 and 1993 
test methods as equivalent methods for purposes of defining regulated 
asbestos-containing materials.141  Far from being truly equivalent 
methods, inasmuch as one averages and the other does not, future 
cases will have to address the due process conundrum of concluding 
that the exact same material is simultaneously regulated and 
unregulated depending upon which of the so-called equivalent, state-
approved test methods for asbestos content is performed.142 
 
137 Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample Analysis 
Test Method, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970, 38,971 (Aug. 1, 1994) (to be codified at 40 CFR pt. 61) 
(emphasis added). 
138 These states include: (1) Colorado, 5 COLO. CODE REGS. 1001-10, §§ I.A.4, IV.E.2 
(1996); (2) Louisiana, LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33 pt. III, § 2711(B) (adopted in 1996, 22 La. 
Reg. 699 (Aug. 1996) and prohibiting averaging of bulk sample content); (3) Maine, 06-
096-425 ME. CODE R. § 6B(2)(b) (Weil 2003) (mandating 1993 test method for flooring 
samples); (4) Massachusetts, 453 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.08 (1998); (5) Minnesota, MINN. 
R. 4620.3460 (1996) (prohibiting averaging as set forth in the EPA’s second clarification 
(discussed infra at Part II.B.3), 20 MINN. REG. 2765, 2770 (June 24, 1996)); (6) New 
Jersey, 38 N.J. REG. 2526 (June 5, 2006); (7) South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-
86.1, § VI(D)(4) (2008); (8) Texas, 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 295.32 (2002); (9) Virginia, 
18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 15-20-459.3 (2002); and (10) Washington, 09-14 WASH. REG. 1, § 
9.02 (June 8, 2009). 
139 27 Tex. Reg. 11,424, 11,426, 11,443 (Dec. 6, 2002). 
140 38 N.J. Reg. 2526. 
141 See 453 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.08(5)(f)(1) (authorizing use of either the 1990 or 
1993 test methods in state-certified laboratories to quantify asbestos fibers in materials); 
S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-86.1, § VI(D)(4) (authorizing use of either the 1990 or 1993 
test methods in state-certified laboratories to quantify asbestos fibers in materials); 09-14 
WASH. REG. 1, § 9.02(D) (allowing use of any EPA-approved test method to quantify 
asbestos). 
142 See S.C. CODE ANN. 61-86.1, § VI(D)(4). 
 64 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 37 
The divergence of enforcement policy and the 1990 asbestos 
NESHAP regulation can be attributed to four key events. 
1.  The EPA’s Courtesy Notice to Laboratories of “Improved” 1993 
Test Method for NESHAP 
In September 1993, the EPA provided a courtesy notice of its new 
1993 test method to the nation’s asbestos analytical laboratories for 
CAA compliance purposes.143  The EPA acknowledged in its letter 
that the promulgated NESHAP test method “remains the EPA 
compliance monitoring method and must be used for AHERA and 
NESHAP monitoring until further notice,” but stated that the 
NESHAP test method’s longevity has been cast into serious doubt 
because “the agency is considering replacing the Interim [1990 
NESHAP] Method with this newer, improved [1993 test method] 
procedure.”144 
2.  First EPA 1994 “Clarification” of NESHAP Test Method 
In January 1994, the EPA felt compelled to respond to many 
questions from industry regarding averaging of the asbestos content 
of multilayered material under the NESHAP test method to determine 
whether the material is regulated.145  The EPA criticized the practice 
of averaging under the NESHAP test method, with one exception: 
certain multilayered wall systems.  Seven months later, on August 1, 
1994, the EPA announced in the Federal Register the availability of 
an improved scientific test method for quantifying asbestos in 
materials, i.e., the 1993 test method, that explicitly rejects 
averaging.146  The EPA did not engage in rulemaking to adopt the 
1993 test method. 
3.  Second EPA 1995 “Clarification” of NESHAP Test Method 
In 1995, the EPA was forced to respond yet again to ongoing 
public frustration with harmonizing the NESHAP 1990 test method 
 
143 See Letter from Michael E. Beard, Chemist, U.S. EPA Atmospheric Research & 
Exposure Assessment Lab., to All Asbestos Analytical Laboratories (Sept. 7, 1993). 
144 Id. 
145 See Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-layered Systems, 
59 Fed. Reg. 542 (Jan. 5, 1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). 
146 See Advisory Regarding Availability of an Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample 
Analysis Test Method, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970 (Aug. 1, 1994). 
 2010] Test Methods Matter 65 
(averaging) and its nonbinding 1993 test method (no averaging).147  In 
the face of the irreconcilable positions of the two test methods, the 
EPA elected to forego rulemaking again, and instead pointed to its 
long-standing “unwritten policy” against averaging.148  The EPA 
admonished industry that its regulatory objectives are more accurately 
set forth in the nonpromulgated 1993 test method, and it promised to 
amend the NESHAP regulation to make the 1993 test method new 
law.149  The agency has never done so. 
4.  Nation’s Asbestos Laboratories Certified for Over a Decade 
Under the 1993 Test Method 
Over the course of a decade, the entire apparatus to perform 
asbestos NESHAP testing shifted from the 1990 to 1993 test methods 
without much public fanfare and without legal challenge, at least until 
the SDG&E case.  Government and private laboratories certified to 
perform asbestos testing are accredited by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
through its National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program 
(NVLAP).150 
In August 1994, NVLAP adopted standards for asbestos testing in 
certified laboratories concurrently with the EPA’s first announcement 
of the availability of its 1993 test method in the Federal Register.151  
Since then, the improved 1993 test method has increasingly become 
the de facto test method for laboratory certification purposes.152 
NVLAP purported to embrace either the 1990 test method or 1993 
test method for certification purposes, yet proceeded to direct the 
 
147 See Asbestos NESHAP Clarification Regarding Analysis of Multi-layered Systems, 
60 Fed. Reg. 65,243 (Dec. 19, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Since 1976, NVLAP has provided third-party accreditation services to government 
and private laboratories to promote national uniformity and competence.  See C. DOUGLAS 
FAISON, WHAT IS THE NATIONAL VOLUNTARY LABORATORY ACCREDITATION PROGRAM 
(2006) (stating 252 national laboratories are accredited under NVLAP for bulk asbestos 
testing), available at http://ts.nist.gov/standards/upload/what-is-the-NVLAP.pdf. 
151 See ERIC B. STEEL ET AL., NIST HANDBOOK 150-3, BULK ASBESTOS ANALYSIS 
(1994). 
152 The 1994 certification manual for asbestos laboratories known as the NVLAP 
Asbestos Handbook references the acceptable application of the 1993 test method.  See id. 
at 11.  (“The laboratory shall use the test method contained in [1990 test method] or the 
current (1993) U.S. EPA method for the analysis of asbestos in building material.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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nation’s laboratories to adhere to the newer 1993 test method.  While 
paying lip service to the NESHAP test method in order to remain 
certified under government-approved standards, NVLAP instructed 
asbestos testing laboratories nationally to implement the EPA’s 1993 
test method.153  Specifically, the 1994 NVLAP Handbook instructs: 
The laboratory shall use the test method contained in The [sic] U.S. 
EPA “Interim Method for the Determination of Asbestos in Bulk 
Insulation Samples” [1990 test method] or the current U.S. EPA 
method for the analysis of asbestos in building material [1993 test 
method]. . . . The laboratory is responsible for ensuring that it 
implements the latest revision of the method.154 
The EPA and NVLAP have thus jointly promoted the shift by 
laboratories to the 1993 test method for well over ten years, 
effectively replacing asbestos tests methods incrementally through a 
combination of EPA clarifications and NVLAP certifications of 
laboratories following those agency clarifications. 
C.  History of Asbestos NESHAP Regulation 
The asbestos NESHAP, set forth at 40 C.F.R. subpart M, is an EPA 
regulation with historical roots in both the 1970 CAA and the 1976 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).155  The NESHAP has been 
amended substantively four times since 1973: in 1975, 1984, 1990, 
and a minor revision in 1994.156  The asbestos NESHAP responds to 
Congress’s mandate under the 1970 CAA to develop emissions 
standards for hazardous air pollutants and has roots in TSCA’s goal of 
eliminating asbestos-containing products from commerce and 
schools.157 
 
153 The 1994 NVLAP Asbestos Handbook expressly cites the 1993 test method 
repeatedly as authority for its accreditation program.  Id. at 1, 9, 10, 11, C-4.  The NVLAP 
Asbestos Handbook also adopts the 1993 test method’s definition of “friable” verbatim, 
not NESHAP’s definition of “friable.”  Id. at 2. 
154 Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
155 Howard, Guerrero, McGrath & Van Orden, supra note 124, at 225–30 (providing a 
detailed chronology of the asbestos NESHAP in Appendix A). 
156 The 1994 amendments added an EPA “Interpretative Rule Governing Roof 
Removal Operations” authorizing, among other things, mechanical removal of roofing 
materials using a “rotating blade (RB) roof cutter.” Interpretive Rule for Roof Removal 
Operations Under the Asbestos NESHAP, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,157–61 (June 17, 1994) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61, subpt. M, app. A (2000)). 
157 See Regulation of Hazardous Chemical Substances and Mixtures, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 
(West 2008); see also Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in 
Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (July 12, 1989) (to be codified at 40  
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In fact, the method to quantify asbestos under the NESHAP was 
enacted originally into law through TSCA rulemaking in 1982 to 
compel school authorities to inspect and identify friable asbestos in 
schools.158  That 1982 TSCA test method159 was readopted in 1987 
under rulemaking to implement the Asbestos Hazard Emergency 
Response Act of 1986 (AHERA), legislation that amended TSCA.160  
The same test method incorporated into TSCA and AHERA 
regulations in the 1980s was later explicitly incorporated into the 
asbestos NESHAP and the definitions of “asbestos-containing 
material” and RACM in 1990 as part of the last major revisions to 
that CAA regulation.161  The NESHAP test method remains today the 
only test method authorized by law to quantify asbestos in material 
for purposes of the CAA’s asbestos NESHAP. 
While the 1973 asbestos NESHAP substantively evolved most 
dramatically during its first seventeen years, the regulation has 
remained fairly static since the 1990 amendments.  The original 1973 
asbestos NESHAP regulation started very modestly.162  It mandated 
three basic procedures to remove friable (then undefined) material 
before demolition of buildings to prevent “emissions of particulate 
asbestos material to outside air.”163  It was silent on test methods. 
The concept of friability was left completely undefined until 1975 
when the EPA amended the NESHAP regulation to define “friable 
asbestos material” as “any material that contains more than [one] 
percent asbestos by weight and that can be crumbled, pulverized, or 
 
C.F.R. pt. 763) (promulgating a three-stage ban of approximately ninety-four percent of all 
commercial asbestos products under TSCA). 
158 See Asbestos; Friable Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools; Identification and 
Notification, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,360, 23,376 (May 27, 1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
763). 
159 See 1990 TEST METHOD, supra note 129. 
160 Asbestos-Containing Materials in Schools, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,826, 41,837 (Oct. 30, 
1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763). 
161 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,376 (original TSCA 1982 test method); 52 Fed. Reg. at 41,837 
(EPA states in 1987 that the existing 1982 TSCA test method is “sufficient” for AHERA 
purposes); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 
48,406, 48,410 (Nov. 20, 1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (incorporating 1987 
AHERA test method into 1990 asbestos NESHAP amendments).  Thus, the test methods 
under TSCA (1982), AHERA (1987), and the asbestos NESHAP (1990) are identical. 
162 Asbestos, Beryllium, and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8820 (Apr. 6, 1973) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). 
163 Id. at 8829. 
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reduced to powder, when dry, by hand pressure.”164  Again, no test 
method was specified to determine one percent asbestos by weight.  
The NESHAP rule was also amended in 1975 to include renovation 
projects, another perceived major source of asbestos fiber 
emissions.165 
The NESHAP regulation was next amended in 1984.  Again, no 
test method was specified.  Essentially, the work practices were 
repromulgated in 1984 after the Supreme Court’s decision in Adamo 
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978), which 
determined that the asbestos handling work practices were not 
technically emission standards and thus were not explicitly authorized 
by an earlier version of the CAA.166  The last major substantive 
NESHAP changes took place in 1990, which included the 
incorporation of the same test method already in use since the 1980s 
in TSCA regulations to determine asbestos content for purposes of the 
one percent CAA jurisdictional threshold. 
D.  1990 Asbestos NESHAP Amendments 
In January 1989, the EPA commenced nearly two years of CAA 
rulemaking that led to major revisions in the asbestos NESHAP 
(November 1990) because of the “overwhelming consensus among 
enforcement officials and industry groups that there is a significant 
level of noncompliance and confusion with the NESHAP.”167 
The 1990 NESHAP amendments moved away from the then-
existing weight-based standard of 1975–1990 with no specified test to 
determine asbestos quantity in materials (one percent by weight) to a 
two-dimensional, area-based standard (one percent by area).  The 
EPA also decided it was “long overdue” after seventeen years to 
adopt a specific test method to determine asbestos content to “reduce 
confusion over what activities are subject to the regulation.”168  
 
164 Amendments to Standards for Asbestos and Mercury, 40 Fed. Reg. 48,292, 48,299 
(Oct. 14, 1975) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (emphasis added). 
165 Id.  (“Demolition” requires the “wrecking or taking out of any load-supporting 
structural member.”). 
166 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Amendments to 
Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,658, 13,658–65 (Apr. 5, 1984) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 61). 
167 See OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 126, at 3-1. 
168 Id. at 4-12. 
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However, the EPA recognized that a promulgated NESHAP test 
method would carry heavy future agency rulemaking obligations: 
One advantage to including the analytical method for the 
identification and quantification of asbestos directly in the 
NESHAP is that the method is then readily available to those who 
have an interest in the asbestos NESHAP.  A disadvantage of this 
approach is that, when the analytical method is revised as a result 
of improvements in methodology, the analytical method contained 
in the NESHAP cannot be changed without going through lengthy 
and time-consuming procedures to amend the regulation. . . . The 
EPA believes that, by including the analytical method used to 
determine asbestos content in the definition, future 
misinterpretation of the definition is unlikely.169 
The EPA decided to incorporate the preexisting test method from 
TSCA (1982) and AHERA (1987) into the NESHAP regulation 
(1990).  This meant that the NESHAP test method would 
automatically change with any future test method updates 
promulgated under TSCA or AHERA without mandating separate 
CAA rulemaking to maintain uniformity and asbestos test method 
consistency among the statutes.  The EPA recognized as early as 1990 
that the enumerated test method adopted into the 1990 NESHAP was 
virtually “locked in place” until such time as either (1) the NESHAP 
regulation was amended separately to adopt a new or unique 
NESHAP test method, or (2) the TSCA/AHERA test method 
regulation, incorporated by reference into the asbestos NESHAP and 
the core definition of “regulated asbestos-containing material,” was 
amended.170  Notably, this did not occur; the core NESHAP 
definitions and their governing test method have never been changed 
since 1990. 
 
169 Id. at 4-16 (emphasis added). 
170 The existing NESHAP regulation definition states “regulated asbestos-containing 
material” must contain “more than [one] percent asbestos as determined using the method 
specified in [TSCA/AHERA] appendix E, subpart E, 40 C.F.R. part 763, section 1, 
Polarized Light Microscopy.”  40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2009) (emphasis added).  As indicated 
by this language, the NESHAP regulation cross-references to the EPA’s test method in a 
non-CAA AHERA regulation.  Specifically, the detailed test protocols of the NESHAP 
test method are outlined in fifteen pages of the AHERA regulation for schools at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E. 
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E.  Representative Sampling Is Still Required Post–Credible 
Evidence Rule and Remains a Fundamental Principle of EPA 
Enforcement Programs and the Asbestos NESHAP Test Method 
In ordering a new trial because of dubious test methods and 
nonrepresentative sampling, the SDG&E court found that a serious 
miscarriage of justice occurred: 
If the [g]overnment is not required to test samples that are 
representative of the suspected [asbestos-containing material], a 
party’s guilt or innocence would depend entirely upon the sample 
collected, no matter how contaminated or unrepresentative.  The 
[g]overnment’s proposed rule would permit the following situation: 
a company tests ACM using a representative sample, finds it is not 
RACM, and on that information, properly concludes there is no 
obligation to comply with the NESHAP requirements.  Later, after 
demolition or renovation activities begin, the regulatory authorities 
retrieve and test bits and pieces from the project that may not be 
representative or whole samples.  If such samples reveal high 
concentrations of asbestos, the company would be subject to 
criminal prosecution for asbestos NESHAP violations even when 
the ACM, based upon a representative sample, is not RACM.  Such 
a result would violate basic principles of due process, which 
‘require[] legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law 
enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement’ of the law.171 
The SDG&E case then moved forward to test whether the credible 
evidence rule relieves the government from having to base its 
criminal prosecutions exclusively upon representative sampling, such 
as post-removal, nonrepresentative debris that contains less than all 
original layering of the pipe coating.  Specifically, the government 
sought to apply the credible evidence rule after the new trial ruling in 
a way that would have allowed CAA prosecutions to be based on 
nonrepresentative samples.172  The court rejected the government’s 
novel application. 
 
171 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2007 WL 
4326773, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007) (order granting defendants’ motion for new trial) 
(citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974)).  The government even suggested, 
without success, that the applicable NESHAP test method may differ depending upon 
whether the government elects to pursue criminal or civil enforcement.  Id. at *5 n.5. 
172 SDG&E successfully argued that the NESHAP test method (and EPA policy 
generally) requires at its basic foundation representative sampling in order to produce (and 
reproduce) consistent, scientific results for asbestos content.  See United States v. SDG&E, 
Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2009 WL 4824489, at *6–*7 (S.D. Cal. 
Aug. 31, 2009) (order denying motion of United States of America to admit designated 
evidence). 
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The SDG&E court noted that the NESHAP test method is squarely 
founded upon the analytical starting point of representative 
samples.173  Section 1.7.1 (sampling) of the 1990 test method174 in 
fact instructs that field sampling “shall be taken in a manner 
prescribed in” the 1979 EPA Guidance Document, “Asbestos-
Containing Materials in School Buildings.”175  Section 1.7.1 of the 
NESHAP test method regulation not only instructs that the 1979 EPA 
Guidance Document “shall” serve as the governing procedure for 
field sampling, it states “[i]f there are any questions about the 
representative nature of the sample, another sample should be 
requested before proceeding with the analysis.” 176  The 1979 EPA 
Guidance Document explains that representative samples should be 
obtained by “penetrating the depth of the material,”177 and further 
instructs field samplers to be “sure to penetrate . . . all the layers of 
the material.”178 
Representative sampling is not unique to the asbestos NESHAP.  
According to a wide array of EPA guidelines, technical manuals, and 
standard operating procedures dating back to at least the early 1990s, 
representative sampling is the cornerstone of the EPA’s enforcement 
programs.179  In fact, representative sampling is a bedrock principle of 
all forms of EPA field sampling, regardless of whether it pertains to 
 
173 Id. 
174 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E, § 1.7.1. 
175 OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. EPA, ASBESTOS-CONTAINING MATERIALS IN 
SCHOOL BUILDINGS: A GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 10 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 GUIDANCE 
DOCUMENT]. 
176 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E, § 1.7.1 (“[s]amples for analysis of asbestos 
content shall be taken in the manner prescribed in Reference 5 [1979 EPA Guidance 
Document] . . . .”). 
177 1979 GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 9. 
178 Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
179 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE TEAM, EPA, EPA SOP NO. 2016, SEDIMENT 
SAMPLING 1 (1994) (stating that Standard Operating Procedures are “applicable to the 
collection of representative sediment samples”); ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE TEAM, EPA, 
EPA SOP NO. 2012, SOIL SAMPLING 2 (2000) (identifying “procedures for the collection 
of representative soil samples”); ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE TEAM, EPA, EPA 540/R-
95/141, SUPERFUND PROGRAM REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING GUIDANCE VOLUME 4: 
WASTE 1 (1995) (stating that “[r]epresentative sampling applies to all phases of a 
Superfund response action”); OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, 
EPA, EPA-330/9-89-003-R, DETERMINATION OF ASBESTOS IN BULK BUILDING 
MATERIALS, app. M (1992) (stating sampling guidelines require representative samples 
for enforcement); EPA, REGION IV ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS STANDARD 
OPERATING PROCEDURES AND QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL, §§ 5.1–5.3 (2001) 
(stating that representative sampling is mandatory). 
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air, soil, sediment, or Superfund sites.180  The EPA’s requirement of 
representativeness is entirely consistent with the SDG&E court’s 
rulings, which held that the asbestos NESHAP requires a 
representative “whole” sample, i.e., one which contains “all layers of 
the pipe wrap” in its original proportions, even if the multilayered 
material is no longer structurally intact.181 
Because the “concept of ‘representativeness’ has always been 
considered a critical component for execution of a sampling plan 
which will adequately characterize the site or area under 
investigation,” the EPA published in the 1990s a series of technical 
bulletins to ensure representative sampling for soil, air, waste, 
ecological, and water investigations.182  According to the EPA’s 
general-purpose standard operating procedure for “all field activities 
that involve sampling,” not only is representative sampling a basic 
enforcement rule, the “sampling itself must be conducted so that 
every sample collected retains its original physical form and chemical 
composition.”183 
Although the EPA has long adhered to representative sampling for 
purposes of regulatory and enforcement determinations, the 
government in the SDG&E case argued that the credible evidence rule 
is an exception to this bedrock principle; indeed, from 2006 to 2009, 
the government remained steadfastly opposed to limiting its 
prosecution to representative sampling, or, alternatively, sought to 
redefine a representative sample as any debris that an inspector 
happened to encounter in the field post-removal.184  Once again, the 
credible evidence rule did not offer a legal foundation to redefine key 
 
180 See sources citing EPA standard operating procedures, supra note 179. 
181 Transcript of Proceedings at 39, United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS 
& 07-CR-0484-DMS (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2007); accord United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 
06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2007 WL 4326773, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 
2007) (order granting defendants’ motion for a new trial).  See also United States v. 
SDG&E, Case 07-CR-0484-DMS, at 1–2 (Sept. 26, 2007) (order requesting supplemental 
briefing) (“Regardless of whether the layers are identifiable, intact, connected to the pipe 
or not, a party should represent that a sample is ‘representative’ only if the sample 
contained all layers of the pipe wrap in the same proportion as originally present on the 
pipe.”) (emphasis in original). 
182 ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE TEAM, EPA, REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING: AIR 1 
(1992); see also sources citing standard operating procedures, supra note 179. 
183 ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE TEAM, EPA, EPA SOP NO. 2001 GENERAL FIELD 
SAMPLING GUIDELINES 1 (1994). 
184 SDG&E, 2007 WL 4326773, at *4–*6 (order granting defendants’ motion for a new 
trial) (describing four arguments advanced by the government as to why representative 
samples are not required in enforcement). 
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scientific concepts or relieve the government of its obligation to prove 
elements of a charged offense.185 
III 
UNITED STATES V. SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO.: AGGRESSIVE 
GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT POLICIES COLLIDE WITH THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE 
RULE 
A.  Facts and Procedural Background of the San Diego Gas & 
Electric Case 
In 2006, the government indicted San Diego Gas & Electric 
Company and three individuals for alleged violations of the CAA and 
its asbestos NESHAP regulation.186  The case related to the removal 
of more than nine miles of underground natural gas pipelines coated 
with a multilayered, anticorrosive system, one layer of which 
contained a thin asbestos felt material saturated in coal tar.187  The 
government contended that the multilayered pipe coating system 
exceeded the one percent regulatory threshold for asbestos fiber 
content, and the asbestos NESHAP work practices were not followed 
during pipe removal operations in 2000 and 2001.188 
The case implicated constitutional issues of first impression, 
including the government’s decision to base its prosecution not upon 
the promulgated test method that requires averaging of multilayered 
materials and representative sampling, but upon a nonbinding single-
 
185 United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2009 WL 
4824489, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) (order denying motion of United States of 
America to admit designated evidence) (rejecting use of credible evidence rule to prove a 
crime through “noncompliant samples and test methods”). 
186 Id. at *1. 
187 United States v. SDG&E, No. 06-CR-0065-DMS, 2006 WL 3913457, at *1 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 21, 2006).  The vast majority of the coating was destroyed before trial, but the 
coating was described as being an inch or more thick with up to six to nine discrete layers.  
One layer was less than 0.5 millimeters thick and contained the asbestos felt embedded in 
a layer of coal tar.  Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Joint Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [Science-Based Elements of Regulated Asbestos-
Containing Material], at 1–2, United States v. SDG&E, No. 07-CR-0484, Doc. 159-2 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 22, 2007).  The waterproof and durable coating system prevented corrosion of 
the steel underground pipes for more than fifty years of service. 
188 SDG&E, 2006 WL 3913457, at *2 (order granting motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 of the indictment for failure to state an offense involving jurisdictional amount of 
“regulated” asbestos-containing material). 
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layer test method, i.e., the 1993 test method.  That nonbinding method 
is purposely designed to bias results of multilayered materials above 
the one percent federal jurisdictional limit by looking at the highest 
results of any single layer, without any averaging and without testing 
from the starting point of representative samples.189  In this case, the 
government’s unaveraged results of up to sixty percent asbestos of the 
thin single layer were used to render all properly averaged testing that 
produced results of less than one percent into “‘meaningless window 
dressing.’”190 
The EPA’s stated purpose in changing tests for its CAA asbestos 
program back in the 1990s was admittedly designed to sweep 
previously unregulated, mainly multilayered materials into the federal 
asbestos NESHAP program.  The EPA accomplished this not through 
rulemaking, but rather through a series of “clarifications.”191  The 
SDG&E case presented just the right set of facts for a federal court to 
conclude that the agency’s shift in policy was improper and lacks the 
force of law absent rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures 
Act.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the first indictment.192 
In lieu of introspection or rulemaking, the EPA instead moved 
ahead with a second indictment.193  In response to the dismissal of the 
first indictment, the government purported to test the only remaining 
physical samples, a few grams of debris, using the correct averaging 
method, which reduced the original asbestos content results by more 
than ninety percent.194  However, the due process and rulemaking 
problems first uncovered in the original indictment only grew in 
 
189 Id. at *4–*9; SDG&E, 2009 WL 4824489, at *3 (order denying motion of United 
States of America to admit designated evidence). 
190 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Joint Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal, supra note 187, at 9–10. 
191 SDG&E, 2006 WL 3913457, at *7 (order granting motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 of the indictment for failure to state an offense involving jurisdictional amount of 
“regulated” asbestos-containing material) (citing Advisory Regarding Availability of an 
Improved Asbestos Bulk Sample Analysis Test Method, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,970 (Aug. 1, 
1994), which states the EPA preferred a different test because “multi-layered samples 
which may contain asbestos in a single layer may have been reported by laboratories as 
nonasbestos-containing”). 
192 Id. at *4–*12. 
193 See United States v. SDG&E, No. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2007 
WL 4326773, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007) (order granting defendants’ motion for new 
trial). 
194 SDG&E, 2009 WL 4824489, at *3 (order denying motion of United States of 
America to admit designated evidence) (finding the original test results of 37–42% 
asbestos dropped on retesting to 1.55–3.66%). 
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significance with the second, as the vast majority of the virtually 
limitless nine miles of pipe coating evidence once available to the 
government for testing in 2000 and 2001 had been destroyed years 
before the first trial in 2007 and was no longer available to either side 
for retesting using the correct, promulgated test method.195  As the 
court described the case, the government “attempted to patch together 
a hodgepodge of evidence” from the original nine miles of pipe that 
through its own mishandling “have been reduced to a small pile of 
rubble that would fit easily within a sandwich-size plastic bag.”196 
The promulgated asbestos NESHAP test method, when applied by 
the defense to the few grams of remaining physical evidence, 
demonstrated that the pipe coating material in SDG&E fell below the 
federally regulated threshold.197  The EPA nonetheless chose to 
introduce at trial the very same misleading and artificially inflated 
single-layer evidence used in the defective first indictment, but now 
under the theory that the federal credible evidence rule made all 
available testing newly relevant.  The evidentiary rule was so broad, 
the government argued, that all test results were relevant, even if they 
were not performed on representative samples nor tested consistently 
with the promulgated method to determine asbestos content in the 
multilayered pipe coating.198 
The EPA thus elected to invoke the credible evidence rule for the 
first time in an environmental criminal case in an effort to cure its 
own mistakes and fundamental post-indictment evidentiary 
shortcomings.  In SDG&E, the government relied upon nothing more 
than a combination of twenty-seven nonrepresentative or improperly 
tested pipe coating samples that failed to comply with the law’s basic 
requirements for averaging the asbestos content using representative 
samples.199  The credible evidence rule not only failed to remedy the 
evidentiary and due process defects of SDG&E—leading to a new 
trial in 2007200 and ultimate dismissal of the consolidated indictments 
 
195 See id. at *13–*14. 
196 Id. at *13. 
197 Id. at *3 & n.5 (stating defendants’ “test results yielded asbestos percentages at or 
below 1% (from 0.7 to 1%)”). 
198 Id. at *15 (arguing noncompliant testing is admissible as circumstantial evidence 
under credible evidence rule). 
199 See id. at *14–*15 (excluding all twenty-seven government-proffered samples). 
200 See United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2007 
WL 4326773 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007) (order granting defendants’ motion for new trial). 
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in 2009201—but both the district court and Ninth Circuit held that the 
credible evidence rule does nothing to supersede the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and Rule 403’s requirement to exclude unfairly prejudicial 
and misleading evidence.202 
Despite government attempts to the contrary, the credible evidence 
rule could not modify or weaken the specific definitional test method 
necessary under the CAA to determine, as a threshold matter, 
federally regulated material.  The court also found the rule does not 
otherwise relieve the government of its basic proof obligations in 
criminal cases to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the basic 
elements of a CAA crime, including proving the pipe coating 
contained more than one percent asbestos as determined by a specific 
test.203  The court reserved its most memorable comments in the long 
battle for last.  In excluding all government evidence before any 
retrial, the court stated: 
The [g]overnment is attempting to present ‘scientific test results’ 
based upon samples that are (a) not representative of what was on 
the pipe, or (b) improperly tested, or both, and then argue to the trier 
of fact that such results reliably establish asbestos content of the 
pipe wrap as it existed on the pipe.  In other words, the 
[g]overnment is taking an apple (a noncompliant sample), calling it 
an orange (a compliant representative and properly tested-sample), 
and inviting the trier of fact to compare oranges and draw an 
inference that the ‘orange’ establishes that the pipe wrap on the pipe 
contained more than [one percent] asbestos and is therefore RACM.  
Following the analogy, a sample is not relevant unless it is an 
orange.  The [g]overnment has no oranges.204 
The credible evidence rule could not make the fundamentally 
noncompliant results suddenly compliant.  Two months later, without 
any available “oranges” (i.e., representative and properly tested 
samples) to prosecute, the government dismissed the consolidated 
indictments.205 
 
201 SDG&E, 2009 WL 4824489, at *15 (order denying motion of United States of 
America to admit designated evidence); United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS 
& 07-CR-0484-DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009) (order dismissing indictments). 
202 SDG&E, 2009 WL 4824489, at *13–*14 (order denying motion of United States of 
America to admit designated evidence); United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 08-50072 & 08-
50073, 2009 WL 689627, at *6 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2009). 
203 See SDG&E, 2009 WL 4824489, at *13–*15 (order denying motion of United 
States of America to admit designated evidence). 
204 See id. at *14. 
205 Government’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-
CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009). 
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Two months after the SDG&E case concluded, a criminal asbestos 
NESHAP defendant in United States v. Tucker attempted to invoke, 
without success, the same test method and representative sampling 
defenses to exclude evidence in the context of a building demolition 
with asbestos-containing roof panels comprised of single-layered, 
homogeneous material.206  However, the facts of SDG&E and Tucker 
are easily distinguishable.  The critical difference is that the SDG&E 
matter involved multilayered material while the Tucker case involved 
single-layered material, where the averaging of nonlayers has no 
significance.  In the SDG&E case, testing in accordance with the 1990 
test method and representative sampling actually demonstrated that 
the material was not regulated.207  In Tucker, asbestos content results 
using different methods were never addressed because such 
comparative testing was never performed. 
In Tucker, the government relied upon debris samples obtained 
from the homogeneous, single-layered roofing material.208  Because it 
is both single-layered and homogeneous, any grab sample or debris in 
Tucker would in theory be representative of the original material.  The 
court therefore concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that the debris 
samples tested by the government are not representative of the roof 
panel material as a whole.”209 
The defendant in Tucker then challenged the government’s 
laboratory testing on the grounds that it “did not precisely comply 
with the stringent requirements of the [1990 test] method, and for this 
reason evidence of the samples and test results should be 
excluded.”210  The government countered by citing the credible 
evidence rule for only the second time in a criminal case.  This time, 
however, the government pointed to the rule not to suggest other test 
methods are admissible, but to refute the allegation that the 
government must be held in strict compliance with step-by-step 
procedures set forth in the binding 1990 test method.  In SDG&E, the 
government had reached for much more than in Tucker; specifically, 
that the credible evidence rule should be construed to allow for both 
 
206 United States v. Tucker, No. 1:09-CR-57, 2009 WL 4856225 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 
2009). 
207 SDG&E, 2009 WL 4824489, at *3 & n.5 (order denying motion of United States of 
America to admit designated evidence). 
208 Tucker, 2009 WL 4856225, at *2–*3. 
209 Id. at *3. 
210 Id. 
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the use of nonrepresentative sampling and the substitution of test 
methods altogether. 
Without analyzing any laboratory data before trial, the Tucker 
court summarily concluded that under the CAA credible evidence rule 
“strict compliance with the testing methods prescribed by the 
NESHAP . . . is not necessary as long as the testing methods actually 
used provide results that are both relevant and credible.”211  However, 
in support of this CAA ruling, the court relied exclusively on non-
CAA authority. 
Even though the credible evidence rule is uniquely a creature of the 
CAA, and no CAA cases supported the government’s position, the 
Tucker court cited as authority two hazardous waste cases under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), one civil212 and 
one criminal.213  Neither hazardous waste case even mentions the 
credible evidence rule.  Further, RCRA’s regulations do not 
incorporate into core definitions of hazardous waste a single 
jurisdictional test method, unlike the asbestos NESHAP for regulated 
asbestos-containing material.  The Tucker court thus failed to 
recognize this critical distinction and the complete irrelevance of 
RCRA cases to bootstrap its application of the credible evidence rule 
into its first CAA criminal case. 
The Tucker court can be fairly criticized for suggesting that the 
credible evidence rule has any logical role in criminal prosecutions 
and for arguably opening the door to sloppy government testing.  In 
fairness, the court also noted that the government testing must still be 
credible, which is obviously harder to evaluate before trial but was 
fully vetted in the SDG&E case following a six-week trial.  The true 
lessons of SDG&E were apparently lost on all the participants in 
Tucker because all private and government laboratories in SDG&E 
openly followed one or more test methods different from the one that 
the asbestos NESHAP specifies.  It was not a matter of whether all 
laboratories in SDG&E failed to “precisely comply” with the 
NESHAP test method. 
 
211 Id. (concluding incorrectly that there is more than one test method under the 
asbestos NESHAP). 
212 Id. (citing United States v. WCI Steel, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 810, 824 (N.D. Ohio 
1999)). 
213 Id. (citing United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1086 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
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B.  The Battle of the Asbestos Fiber Quantification Test Methods: 
Which One Really Determines Whether Materials Contain More 
than One Percent Asbestos and Fall Within the Clean Air Act’s 
Jurisdiction? 
The collision of the credible evidence rule and constitutional due 
process protections in the SDG&E case boiled down to two basic 
facts.  First, there is one, and only one, test method mandated by law 
for quantifying the SDG&E pipe coating asbestos content for 
purposes of the asbestos NESHAP: a CAA method which is 
incorporated into the very definition of asbestos-containing material 
and RACM.214  Second, this NESHAP test method was promulgated 
into law by the EPA as part of the 1990 amendments to the asbestos 
NESHAP regulation and has remained on the books without 
modification ever since.215  The promulgated test requires averaging 
of the asbestos content in each layer of a representative multilayered 
material.216  The 1993 test method does not.  As discussed above, the 
EPA made a policy choice to rewrite the 1990 test method through a 
series of subsequent clarifications in 1994 and 1995, coupled with 
widespread public circulation of its preferred 1993 test method,217 but 
the EPA took no rulemaking steps whatsoever either to rescind or 
supersede the 1990 test method. 
SDG&E is not the first case in which the EPA walked away from a 
promulgated CAA test method that it considered deficient in its 
practical application.  In Donner Hanna Coke Corp. v. Costle,218 the 
EPA rejected the law’s specified test method for opacity compliance 
for New York coke plant operations, a revised version of Method 9 
 
214 See 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2009) (defining “[f]riable asbestos material” and 
“[n]onfriable asbestos-containing material”). 
215 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Asbestos NESHAP 
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,406, 48,415 (Nov. 20, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 61.141). 
216 United States v. SDG&E, No. 06-CR-0065-DMS, 2006 WL 3913457, at *5 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 21, 2006) (order granting motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the 
indictment for failure to state an offense involving jurisdictional amount of “regulated” 
asbestos-containing material).  The NESHAP test method provides: “When discrete strata 
are indentified, each is treated as a separate material so that fibers are first identified and 
quantified in that layer only, and then the results for each layer are combined to yield an 
estimate of asbestos content for the whole sample.”  Interim Method of the Determination 
of Asbestos in Bulk Insulation Samples, 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E., § 1.7.2.1 
(1995). 
217 See supra Part II.B. 
218 Donner Hanna Coke Corp. v. Costle, 464 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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which required averaging of twenty-four visual observation results, in 
favor of a “stopwatch technique” that, like in SDG&E, did not 
average and was much more likely to find twenty percent opacity 
violations.219  The coke plant operator refused to allow the EPA site 
access to perform its new stopwatch test, and the operator was 
threatened with criminal enforcement in response.220  The stopwatch 
test had never been adopted by the EPA through rulemaking.221  The 
plant operator sued to prevent what it considered to be an unlawful 
EPA search. 
The Donner Hanna court concluded that the informal stopwatch 
test suddenly favored by the EPA was such a substantial change in the 
revised Method 9 that it was unenforceable because the new test 
violated the rulemaking requirements of both the Administrative 
Procedures Act and the CAA.222  Over thirty years ago, the Donner 
Hanna court was one of the first to make the astute observation that 
test methods matter, stating that “the method of determining 
compliance with an emission standard can affect the level of 
performance required by the standard, even though the standard itself 
has not changed.”223  SDG&E essentially made the same argument 
three decades later, and that court essentially reached the same 
conclusion as in Donner Hanna. 
The SDG&E case is the first known case, civil or criminal, since 
the original 1973 promulgation of the asbestos NESHAP work 
practices regulation where the central issue was whether the EPA can 
demonstrate that material is regulated under the CAA and the asbestos 
NESHAP on the weight of a purely discretionary and nonpromulgated 
agency test method of choice.224  SDG&E successfully argued that 
 
219 Id. at 1300–02. 
220 Id. at 1297–98. 
221 Id. at 1301. 
222 Id. at 1304–05. 
223 Id. at 1304. 
224 Over 100 published and unpublished civil and criminal asbestos NESHAP cases 
exist since the 1973 establishment of a CAA asbestos program.  The vast majority are civil 
disputes regarding above-ground building materials where the one percent jurisdictional 
threshold of the NESHAP regulation to the particular material at issue has never been 
disputed.  The published and unpublished asbestos NESHAP criminal cases, generally 
post-dating the 1990 NESHAP amendments, involve common denominators such as dry 
removal of above-ground building materials, unlicensed workers, failure to give ten-day 
notices, and improper disposal or abandonment of waste at unlicensed facilities.  Until the 
SDG&E case, none of the civil or criminal matters involved coal tar pipe coating, and none 
addressed the jurisdictional consequences of prosecuting crimes under the nonbinding  
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test methods matter because asbestos content in materials can be 
manipulated in its reported results by a number of different 
methods.225  Depending upon the specific method followed, each 
method can produce dramatically different results for asbestos 
content, from zero to one hundred percent, for the exact same 
material.226  This is because some asbestos quantification test methods 
average while others do not.227  Some visually estimate asbestos fiber 
content under low magnification; others use X-ray diffraction 
techniques.228  The EPA itself has developed no less than three 
different methods to quantify asbestos fibers in materials, only one of 
which is actually incorporated into the CAA regulations.229  One week 
after the SDG&E court granted a new trial on December 7, 2007, the 
EPA’s NEIC laboratory changed its single-layer test method to 
require averaging for multilayered pipe coating.230 
 
1993 test method.  One administrative EPA Environmental Appeals Board decision 
concluded that the 1993 test method could support a $9160 penalty based upon the weight 
of two post–1990 EPA clarifications purporting to disallow averaging for multilayered 
material under the NESHAP test method.  See In re LVI Envtl. Servs., Inc., 10 E.A.D. 99 
(2001) (concluding Category I asphalt roofing material is regulated where any single layer 
is above one percent, even though asbestos content falls below one percent when all layers 
averaged under NESHAP test method). 
225 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Joint Motion for 
New Trial [Science-Based Elements of Regulated Asbestos-Containing Material], supra 
note 187, at 1, 5–10; Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Joint Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [Science-Based Elements of Regulated Asbestos-
Containing Material] at 1–6, United States v. SDG&E, Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-
0484-DMS, Doc. 161-2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2007). 
226 The mere act of averaging the SDG&E pipe coating material dropped the reported 
results by over 90% from 37–42% to 1.55–3.66% asbestos.  United States v. SDG&E, 
Nos. 06-CR-0065-DMS & 07-CR-0484-DMS, 2009 WL 4824489, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
31, 2009). 
227 40 C.F.R. pt. 763, subpt. E, app. E., § 1.7.2.1 (averaging of bylayer asbestos results). 
228 Id. § 1.7.2.4 (visual estimation of asbestos fibers); id. § 2 (quantifying asbestos 
content by X-ray diffraction quantification testing); 1993 TEST METHODS, supra note 134, 
§ 2.5 (discussing analytical electron microscopy). 
229 See 1990 TEST METHOD, supra note 129; 1993 TEST METHOD, supra note 134; 
NAT’L ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS CTR., NEICPROC/01-002R5, DETERMINATION 
OF ASBESTOS IN BULK BUILDING MATERIALS (2008). 
230 The NEIC asbestos test manual was amended on December 13, 2007, one week 
after the new trial ruling.  See NAT’L ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS CTR., supra note 
229, at 26–27.  Unlike all prior versions of the NEIC test manual, which are silent on this 
issue, the new version addresses hypothetical multilayered “pipewrap”; expressly adopts 
volumetric averaging, and essentially the same volumetric averaging formula used during 
the first SDG&E trial, as the proper procedure to quantify asbestos in the material; and 
uses, for purposes of illustration, the example of ten-layered “pipewrap.”  Id. at 27. 
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C.  Wisconsin Rejects SDG&E and the Necessity for Rulemaking to 
Make the 1993 Test Method Enforceable 
Although one federal court ruled that switching from the 1990 
averaging NESHAP test method to the 1993 single-layer test method 
without rulemaking violates the Administrative Procedures Act, and 
at least ten states have undergone such rulemaking to adopt the new 
1993 test method, confusion still exists.  In a four-three decision in 
2008, the Wisconsin Supreme Court came to the completely opposite 
conclusion of SDG&E and its own lower court of appeals.231 
In State v. Harenda Enterprises,232 an asbestos contractor faced 
$37,138.50 in civil fines under the Wisconsin SIP for the removal of 
multilayered asbestos-containing wall material from the Milwaukee 
Auditorium allegedly without following all required NESHAP work 
practices to minimize the release of fibers.233  The contractor’s 
laboratory testing indicated that none of the predemolition samples 
exceeded the one percent asbestos regulatory threshold.234  The state’s 
single-layer testing, however, showed at least one layer contained 
more than one percent asbestos and, in the state’s view, made the 
entire multilayered wall material regulated.235 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the 1990 NESHAP 
test method regarding averaging was “ambiguous” and the EPA’s 
1994 and 1995 clarifications were agency interpretations that single-
layer testing, not averaging, is required.236  The Harenda Enterprises 
court admitted that “[i]t is often difficult to discern the difference 
between an interpretive rule and a legislative rule, as they lie upon a 
 
231 In a three-zero decision, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded in a civil 
enforcement action that the multilayered auditorium wall material required averaging 
under the 1990 test method.  State v. Harenda Enters., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Wis. 
App. 2006), rev’d, 746 N.W.2d 25 (Wis. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 573 (2008).  The 
state invoked the 1994 and 1995 EPA clarifications to base its civil case on a single layer 
theory to show that the multilayered wall materials exceed the one percent jurisdictional 
threshold.  Id. at 437–38.  The court of appeals held that the EPA clarifications are “at 
odds with the clear command of § 1.7.2.1” and reversed the trial court’s summary 
judgment ruling in the State’s favor.  Id. at 438–39. 
232 Harenda Enters., Inc., 746 N.W.2d at 25. 
233 Id. at 31. 
234 Id. at 30–31. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 28, 34, 42. 
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‘hazy continuum.’”237  Nonetheless, it found no obligation whatsoever 
for the state to undergo rulemaking to make the single-layer testing of 
the 1993 test method the law of Wisconsin.238 
In a sharp dissent, Justice Ziegler followed the rationale of the 
SDG&E court and found the plain language of the regulation and its 
promulgated averaging test method completely inconsistent with the 
EPA clarifications supporting the single-layer 1993 test method for 
multilayered materials.239  The dissent criticized the majority’s 
reasoning, especially the conclusion that the EPA clarifications are 
merely nonsubstantive interpretations and are thus enforceable 
without any state adoption of the clarifications whatsoever.240  The 
Harenda Enterprises case currently stands alone.  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court never explains why, if state rulemaking is 
unnecessary, at least ten states thus far have felt compelled to adopt 
the 1993 test method through rulemaking. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Since its adoption in 1997, the EPA credible evidence rule has 
incrementally expanded beyond its modest penalty criteria beginnings 
under CAA section 113(e)(1), as amended in 1990.  The EPA and 
others have carved out a niche application that favors the use of 
continuous emissions monitoring data in civil cases, generally citizen 
suits, to prove violations where reference test data is sporadic. 
The credible evidence rule, however, has recently suffered 
evidentiary setbacks and collided against Administrative Procedures 
Act and due process constraints.  The rule is unavailable to states or 
citizen enforcers unless expressly adopted by state SIPs.  It has thus 
far found no solid application in criminal environmental cases, mainly 
because the Federal Rules of Evidence and heightened due process 
protections prohibit the use of artificially inflated nonreference data. 
 
237 Id. at 32 (citing American Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)).  Under federal law, a legislative rule is subject to rulemaking requirements under 
the Administrative Procedures Act, but an interpretive rule is not. 
238 Id. at 39–40. 
239 Id. at 42 (Ziegler, J., dissenting) (“Despite the fact that the ‘clarifications’ do not 
clarify the alleged ambiguity, are contrary to the promulgated rule, and were not adopted 
in this state, the majority still gives them the force of law.”). 
240 Id. at 44–48 (Ziegler, J., dissenting). 
 84 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 37 
The SDG&E case is a bellwether case because it is the first to hold 
under relentless government pressure that the EPA’s credible 
evidence rule, if applicable to criminal cases at all, does nothing to 
supersede the Federal Rules of Evidence, redefine basic scientific 
concepts, or rewrite the CAA’s promulgated test methods that define 
which materials are regulated under the CAA in the first instance. 
 
 
